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The political crisis in Ukraine, particularly the bloodshed seen on 18–20 February and the sub-
sequent Russian intervention in Crimea, has sparked fears of another possible wave of immi-
grants heading to the EU. However, the country was partially politically stabilised (at least in 
its central and western parts), and this has made the scenario of a mass migration of people 
from Ukraine rather unlikely. If there is no civil war in Ukraine, any further development of the 
political situation in Ukraine may have only an indirect impact on the actual migration. Should 
the political instability continue, the Ukrainian economy remain in recession while jobs are 
available for Ukrainian immigrants in the EU, then an increase in the migration of Ukrainian cit-
izens to the EU, including Poland, would be possible. In the short term there may be two char-
acteristic groups of immigrants: (1) young people who will attempt to leave Ukraine for good 
due to the lack of job opportunities; (2) circulating migrants, mainly from western Ukraine, 
who will be looking for temporary jobs. Only if the economic downturn trend and political 
turmoil in Ukraine continues for a longer time, will settlement migration increase. 
The implications of the political situation
For over the 20 years that the Ukrainian state has 
existed, the tradition of political immigration 
has not developed, as opposed to the culture 
of labour migration. Ukrainian citizens are not 
included in the group of 30 nationalities which 
most frequently apply for refugee status in EU 
countries. In the “old” EU countries very few 
asylum applications by Ukrainian citizens have 
received media coverage, and in these cases the 
applications were due to discrimination on the 
grounds of sexual orientation or religious be-
liefs. However, in recent years unfair verdicts in 
trials and harassment on the part of the judicial 
system and the public order bodies have been 
mentioned as reasons for applying for refugee 
status. With regard to the November-February 
social protests in Ukraine, several hundred peo-
ple decided to leave the country including those 
injured during the clashes in the Maidan who 
left to be treated abroad. 
In the present situation, the goals of Kyiv 
Maidan protesters have been achieved and the 
provisional authorities are composed of sup-
porters of the Ukrainian Maidan, and so there 
are no grounds to assume that political migra-
tion abroad on a national scale may increase. 
However, some intra-regional movements are 
possible. Ethnic Ukrainians from Crimea and 
Eastern Ukraine may decide to leave to other 
parts of Ukraine and to a lesser extend aboard. 
The same relates to Russian-speaking migrants 
who however will most probably choose Russia 
as their destination. It cannot be ruled out that 
certain people linked with the former Ukrainian 
leadership may request asylum in EU countries, 
fearing harassment from the new government. 
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Furthermore, a section of Ukrainian labour mi-
grants who are currently residing in the EU may 
wish to extend their stay abroad due to the 
continuing political instability at home. Nev-
ertheless, unless a civil war happens, these are 
not likely to be large-scale processes should not 
affect the proper functioning of the immigra-
tion systems of the EU countries. 
At present there are visible signs of interre-
gional tensions which could encourage the 
population from eastern or southern Ukraine 
to immigrate to the EU countries. However the 
population in these regions is in general less 
inclined to consider immigration as an option. 
Secondly, inhabitants of Ukraine’s eastern and 
southern districts in the majority opt for Russia 
as the final destination of their emigration. Sail-
ors are another important group of migrants 
from these regions of Ukraine are sailors and 
their employment depends above all on the job 
supply in particular destination countries, not 
on the situation in Ukraine. Some growth in the 
number of Ukrainians migrating to Russia after 
Russia’s military intervention in Crimea was ob-
served. However, it is not possible to indicate 
the actual scale of this due to the high politi-
cisation of that issue. In early March the Rus-
sian authorities stated that as many as 143,000 
Ukrainians applied for asylum in Russia. This in-
formation was, though, later denied. 
Another migration risk is linked with the direc-
tion of foreign policy that the new Ukrainian 
government will choose. If Russia toughens reg-
ulations regarding the right of Ukrainian work-
ers to reside in its territory, for example follow-
ing Ukraine signing the association agreement 
with the EU, Ukrainian workers may re-orien-
tate their job search towards the EU markets.
In parallel, it is worth bearing in mind that the 
impact of protracted political crises on migra-
tion decisions is much more subtle and less 
researched than the influence of economic 
factors. Political factors may trigger mass immi-
gration but this is above all the case when they 
substantially affect the quality of life of inhabi-
tants in a given country, for example, the quali-
ty of public services, public security, the quality 
of education, the standard of health care, the 
general consensus in society and the level of 
tolerance for particular minority groups etc. 
Labour migrants
In Ukraine’s current post-revolution situation, 
the following factors will be crucial for further 
migration dynamics: the situation of Ukrainian 
migrants in EU countries and the country’s fur-
ther economic and social development. 
Due to the intensive migration which has 
been continuingongoing since the beginning 
of the 1990s, Ukrainian citizens are becoming 
ever more firmly rooted in the EU countries1. 
Every year between half a million and a million 
Ukrainians are granted short-term visas to the 
Schengen countries; the number of long-term 
visas is also on the increase. A trend can be 
observed for Ukrainian immigrants to legalise 
their stay in the EU. In 2011 Ukrainian citizens 
received the most (204,000) residence permits 
(temporary or permanent) in the EU-28. The 
liberalisation of Poland’s immigration policy 
played an important role in this process, in-
cluding the introduction of the possibility to 
work temporarily without the obligation to re-
ceive a work permit. In 2012 Ukrainian citizens 
were granted over 223,000 permits of this kind 
1 Eurostat data; aggregated data for 2012 are not yet 
available.
It should not be expected that there will 
be a large wave of Ukrainian citizens who 
will try to apply for refugee status in EU 
countries. Political immigrants prefer to 
make use of other legal possibilities for 
residence in the EU.
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and a further 137,000 in the first half of 20132.
Coupled with the trend to legalise the stay is 
a slow downward trend which may be seen with 
regard to the dynamics of Ukrainian emigration. 
Firstly, the deceleration of emigration may be at-
tributed to Ukraine’s demographic potential be-
ing exhausted, including above all the diminish-
ing number of the population in general, which 
is linked to high migration rates, a low birth rate 
and a high mortality rate. Ukrainian society is still 
relatively young but within the next ten years the 
aging of the population will result in the num-
ber of people of working age diminishing3 and 
it is this group who usually tend to migrate. Sec-
ondly, fewer Ukrainians are deciding to leave the 
country due to limited job opportunities in a cri-
sis-stricken EU.
The economic crisis in the EU hit in areas of em-
ployment such as construction and households 
(childcare and care, household chores) particu-
larly hard and it is in these areas that Ukrainian 
migrant workers traditionally found jobs. Even 
though the significance of Russia as the final 
destination country for Ukrainian migrants is di-
minishing, it still has largest number of Ukrainian 
immigrants worldwide4. Some Ukrainian work-
ers, formerly employed in the EU construction 
sector, moved to Russia to seek jobs as the eco-
nomic situation there improved. 
2 Data from the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy of the 
Republic of Poland. 
3 Forecast from the Institute for Demography and Social 
Studies at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. 
4 International Labour Organization, Report on the Meth-
odology, Organization and the Results of a Modular 
Sample Survey on Labour Migration in Ukraine, 2013.
The current level of Ukrainian migrant stock5 in 
the EU is estimated at approximately one mil-
lion people. The most popular final destination 
countries are as follows: Poland, Italy, the Czech 
Republic, Spain and Germany. At present the 
number of Ukrainian labour migrants in Russia 
is at a similar level – estimated at 500,000 – one 
million people6. The circular migration, con-
sisting of alternating periods of work abroad 
and in the country of origin, remains the most 
widespread type of migration for Ukrainians, 
although the significance of long-term emigra-
tion is also growing7. 
A possible forecast 
The initial findings of the report “Forecasting 
migration between the EU, V4 and Eastern Eu-
rope: the impact of visa abolition”8 written by 
OSW and seven other research institutions from 
Central and Eastern Europe indicate that the 
most important factor encouraging Ukrainian 
migrants to go abroad are the high salaries 
they expect to earn in the countries of the EU 
and the jobs available there. The level of sal-
aries and employment in Ukraine also has an 
impact, if slightly smaller, as well as favourable 
immigration policies of particular destination 
countries. Below are presented three forecast 
variants: the medium variant, high variant 
and the low variant. It must be borne in mind 
though that due to the imperfection of statis-
tical data (many migrants still remain irregular, 
statistics poorly reflect circular migration, the 
statistical data provided reflect to a larger or 
smaller degree actual dynamics of migrations 
5 The number of people residing in a particular destina-
tion country at a given moment.
6 Ibid. 
7 International Labour Organization, op. cit. A. Pozniak, 
External labour migration of Ukraine as a factor of so-
cio-demographic and economic development, CARIM 
East Research Reports 2012/04. 
8 The project is co-financed by the international Viseg-
rad Fund; for more information on the project see: 
http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/projekty/forecasting-migra-
tion-between-eu-v4-and-eastern-europe-impact-vi-
sa-abolition 
A slow downward trend can be observed 
in the financially motivated migration of 
Ukrainians to the EU. The financial crisis 
hit particularly hard in the areas of em-
ployment in which Ukrainian immigrants 
traditionally worked.
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in particular EU countries) this forecast is more 
likely to point to tendencies rather than show 
actual figures. Furthermore, due to differentials 
in the methodology and the lack of long-term 
migration data, the initial model covers only 12 
EU countries. 
As is shown in the graphs included in the Ap-
pendix, the Ukrainian migrant stocks in EU 
countries may increase in the next few years 
(depending on economic parameters). This 
does not however necessarily mean that the 
migration dynamics will actually intensify; it 
is rather to a large extent dependent on the 
above mentioned tendency of migrants legal-
ising their stay abroad. It can be clearly seen 
(except in the high variant ) that towards 2026 
or 2028 the stock of Ukrainian citizens in the EU 
may start to diminish and this downward trend 
may persist in the long-term. 
Circular migrants, 
young people and students 
Should the economic situation in Ukraine dete-
riorate, the migration may intensify, particularly 
circular migration since this is the fastest meth-
od of responding to decreasing revenues of 
the population as it does notrequire wholesale 
life strategy changes but only a reorientation. 
Furthermore, the sectors of EU labour markets 
in which Ukrainian migrants work are usual-
ly characterised by temporary, often seasonal 
work. Long-term migration requires greater 
preparation, including the alignment of pro-
fessional qualifications, learning the language 
etc. However, in case of a prolonged crisis, the 
families of Ukrainian migrants residing in the 
EU may wish to join them. 
Another group which may be more eager to 
leave Ukraine are people aged between 18 and 
29, including students. As indicated in socio-
logical studies people from this age category 
are more inclined to go abroad and care more 
about non-material assets such as education 
and professional development opportunities 
etc. Students who have the possibility to apply 
for different scholarships and exchange pro-
grammes constitute a special group. Neverthe-
less, there will not be a surge in the number of 
students leaving Ukraine, especially those who 
do not already have ties with the countries of 
the EU. Contrary to appearances, Ukrainian stu-
dents are able to quite realistically assess the 
situation on the EU labour markets and while 
leaving Ukraine they take into account their 
linguistic competences, material resources etc. 
Poland may become an important destination 
country for Ukrainian students who already 
constitute the main group of foreigners study-
ing at universities in Poland (9,747 students in 
the 2012/2013 academic year)9. 
Summary
The current development of the political situa-
tion in Ukraine does not indicate that the pos-
sibility of a substantial increase in the political 
emigration of Ukrainians exists, unless civil war 
breaks out. As for labour migration, should the 
socio-economic situation in Ukraine deteriorate, 
this may rise in the short term. Ukrainians will 
opt for those EU countries where there are the 
most job opportunities and the possibility of 
legal residence (due to the economic crisis of 
2008-2012 a section of Ukrainian migrants have 
moved from southern European countries and 
the Czech Republic to Poland and, to a lesser ex-
tent, to Germany). Possible restrictions with re-
9 Data from the report “International students in Poland 
in 2013” prepared by the Conference of Chancellors of 
Higher Education Schools in Poland and the Perspekty-
wy Education Foundation. 
The lifting of the requirement for short-
term EU visas for Ukrainians should not 
cause an increase in the number of Ukrai-
nians emigrating.
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APPENDIX
Graph 1. Initial forecast of the number of Ukrainian citizens in 12 EU countries 
in 2013–2015: aggregated data (three variants)
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gard to Ukrainian workers on the Russian labour 
market may cause part of this group to head for 
the EU. If the situation in the Ukrainian econo-
my does not show signs of improvement, this 
may urge a greater number of Ukrainians to opt 
for circular migration. Permanentmigration may 
also increase, particularly among young people. 
However, in the long term substantial migration 
from Ukraine to the EU should not be expected. 
Similarly, the possible lifting of the requirement 
for short-term Schengen visas for Ukrainians 
(entitling bearers to spend 90 days in every 180) 
should not cause a dramatic spike in the num-
ber of Ukrainians deciding to move to the EU. 
This stems above all from the liberal visa policy 
of the Schengen countries – Ukrainian migrants 
have a wide spectrum of legal possibilities to 
enter EU territory. Secondly, Ukrainian citizens 
will still not have the right to live and work in 
EU countries, which is the only measure that 
could significantly simplify their situation there 
and grant them conditions comparable to those 
which EU citizens enjoy. Were immigration lev-
els to increase following a liberalisation of the 
visa regime, it will be rather short-term and will 
concern above all circular migrants. Those who 
often travel will find it easier to enter EU terri-
tory and then go back home. The lack of a visa 
requirement does not however solve the funda-
mental problem, viz. the availability of jobs for 
migrants. 
If in the long term Ukraine chooses integra-
tion with the EU as its model of political and 
economic development, the importance of the 
EU as a final destination for migrants will be 
enhanced, at the expense of Russia. However, 
as with the issue of visa liberalisation, it is the 
working conditions that Ukrainian migrants are 
offered in the EU countries that will be of cru-
cial importance.
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APPENDIX
Graph 2. Initial forecast of the number of Ukrainian citizens in 12 EU countries 
in 2013–2050 (medium variant) 
Source: This proprietary analysis is based on the econometric model examining interdependence between the Ukrainian migrant 
stocks  in the EU and the level of GDP and the unemployment rate in destination  countries and the sending  country. 
It covers 12 countries (Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, 
Slovenia, Spain and Sweden) and three scenarios of the development of the economic situation (intermediate – a 4% in-
crease in GDP annually in Ukraine and 2% in the EU; low – a 6% increase in GDP in Ukraine and 2% in the EU; high – a 2% 
increase in GDP in Ukraine and 2% in the EU). Attention: this is a long-term model which was developed before Ukraine’s 
economic results were published in 2013 (0% increase in GDP).
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The publication has been developed in the framework 
of a project: “Forecasting migration between the EU, V4 and 
Eastern Europe: impact of visa abolition” funded by the Interna-
tional Visegrad Fund and Centre for Eastern Studies.
